Explanation : a causally constrained pragmatic account by Braddon, David-Mitchell
  THESES SIS/LIBRARY        TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2      FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY      EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USE OF THESES 
 
 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
Explanation 
. . 
A Causally Constrained Pragmatic Account 
· A Thesis Submitted In Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at the Australian National University 
David Braddon-Mitchell 
Department of Philosophy, RSSS 
December 1988 
For Deborah Lavers 
This thesis is my own work, written while I was a 
Research Scholar in the Department of Philosophy, 
Research School of Social Sciences, at the Australian 
National University. As far as I am aware, all assis-
tance and sources are acknowledged. 
\ 
(David Braddon-Mitchell) 
Acknowledgements 
First I must acknowledge the assistance of my supervisors, Frank Jackson 
and Philip Pettit. My intellectual debt to them will be obvious to any reader 
of these pages; what will not be so obvious is their generosity with helpful 
comment, and infectious enthusiasm for the discipline. For all this I thank 
them. 
An earlier version of the Appendix was read to the Brisbane conference 
of the AAP in 1987, and to the Department of Philosophy in the RSS. Earlier 
versions of chapters 2 and 6 have been read to seminars in the RSSS, and the 
Department of Philosophy in the Faculties, respectively. I have in all cases 
benefited from the discussion. Much of the material in Ch. 7 is from a paper 
jointly written with John Fitzpatrick, a version of which was read to the 
Department of Philosophy in the RSSS. We both, I can say with confidence, 
benefited from the comments arising from the discussion. 
Many people have helped in ways which have borne directly on the 
writing of this thesis. I have, where possible, mentioned particular points of 
ii1debtedness where they occur in the text. The following is a (probably 
incomplete) list of those who have helped by discussing material from the 
thesis, or in other direct ways: Barbara Davidson, Martin Davies, Kathinka 
Evers, John Fitzpatrick, Paul Griffiths, Virginia Hart, Loraine Hugh, Huw 
Price, Dominic Hyde, Deborah Lavers, Libby Prior, Kim Sterelny and Mark 
Walker. 
The writing of a PhD thesis is not something which is causally isolated 
from those around its author. It is customary to acknowledge those who 
have in some way helped in its production. This seems to me a rather thesis-
centred view of the world; one should in fairness add to it 
Acknowledgements v 
those who have been affected by it. Amongst those who have both helped in, 
or put up with, the production of this thesis I must mention Marina Farnan, 
Virginia Hart, Margaret Jones, Geoff Kennett, Deborah Lavers, Mask 
Mitchell, Lisa Paul, Maureen Sheehan, Julian Thomas and Richard Webb. 
Abstract 
This thesis argues that explanation consists in giving pragmatically selected 
and often counterfactual information about causes. It begins by examining 
pragmatic theories of explanation, and argues that they are right insofar as 
pragmatics are properly a part of explanation, not just an adjunct to 
explanation. In the following chapters it is argued that while pragmatics 
may be necessary for an account of explanation, they are not sufficient. 
Additional constraints are imposed regarding the need for explanatory 
information to be causal information, and usually counterfactual 
explanation if higher-level explanation is to be accounted for. The account 
thus developed is then applied to problems in metaphysics, philosophy of 
psychology and philosophy of language. It is argued that causal 
reductionism can seem more plausible in the light of a good account of 
explanation, that propositional attitudes can be seen to have explanatory 
virtues (on a certain account), that Fodor's Language of Thought Hypothesis 
suffers in the light of the right account of explanation, and that taking into 
account certain interest dependencies in explanation makes the development 
of an account of the reference of kind terms easier. 
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